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FTPEXT Working Group Mark Allman Internet Draft NASA Lewis/Sterling Software Expires: October, 1998 Shawn Ostermann Ohio University April, 1999 FTP Security Considerations <draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt> Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet- Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Distribution of this document is unlimited. Please send comments to the FTP Extension working group (FTPEXT-WG) of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) at <ftp-wg@hethmon.com>. Subscription address is <ftp-wg-request@hethmon.com>. Discussions of the group are archived at <URL:http://w3.hethmon.com/ftpext/>. Abstract The specification for the File Transfer Protocol contains a number of mechanisms that can be used to compromise network security. The FTP specification allows a client to instruct a server to transfer files to a third machine. This third-party mechanism, known as proxy FTP, causes a well known security problem. The FTP specification also allows an unlimited number of attempts at entering a user's password. This allows brute force "password guessing" attacks. This document provides suggestions for system administrators and those implementing FTP servers that will decrease the security problems associated with FTP. 1 Introduction The File Transfer Protocol specification [PR85] provides a mechanism that allows a client to establish an FTP control connection and transfer a file between two FTP servers. This "proxy FTP" mechanism Expires: April, 1999 [Page 1]  draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt October 1998 can be used to decrease the amount of traffic on the network; the client instructs one server to transfer a file to another server, rather than transferring the file from the first server to the client and then from the client to the second server. This is particularly useful when the client connects to the network using a slow link (e.g., a modem). While useful, proxy FTP provides a security problem known as a "bounce attack" [CERT97:27]. In addition to the bounce attack, FTP servers can be used by attackers to guess passwords using brute force. This document does not contain a discussion of FTP when used in conjunction with strong security protocols, such as IP Security. These security concerns should be documented, however they are out of the scope of this document. This paper provides information for FTP server implementers and system administrators, as follows. Section 2 describes the FTP "bounce attack". Section 3 provides suggestions for minimizing the bounce attack. Section 4 provides suggestions for servers which limit access based on network address. Section 5 provides recommendations for limiting brute force "password guessing" by clients. Next, section 6 provides a brief discussion of mechanisms to improve privacy. Section 7 provides a mechanism to prevent user identity guessing. Section 8 discusses the practice of port stealing. Finally, section 9 provides an overview of other FTP security issues related to software bugs rather than protocol issues. 2 The Bounce Attack The version of FTP specified in the standard [PR85] provides a method for attacking well known network servers, while making the perpetrators difficult to track down. The attack involves sending an FTP "PORT" command to an FTP server containing the network address and the port number of the machine and service being attacked. At this point, the original client can instruct the FTP server to send a file to the service being attacked. Such a file would contain commands relevant to the service being attacked (SMTP, NNTP, etc.). Instructing a third party to connect to the service, rather than connecting directly, makes tracking down the perpetrator difficult and can circumvent network-address-based access restrictions. As an example, a client uploads a file containing SMTP commands to an FTP server. Then, using an appropriate PORT command, the client instructs the server to open a connection to a third machine's SMTP port. Finally, the client instructs the server to transfer the uploaded file containing SMTP commands to the third machine. This may allow the client to forge mail on the third machine without making a direct connection. This makes it difficult to track attackers. Expires: April, 1999 [Page 2]  draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt October 1998 3 Protecting Against the Bounce Attack The original FTP specification [PR85] assumes that data connections will be made using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [Pos81]. TCP port numbers in the range 0 - 1023 are reserved for well known services such as mail, network news and FTP control connections [RP94]. The FTP specification makes no restrictions on the TCP port number used for the data connection. Therefore, using proxy FTP, clients have the ability to tell the server to attack a well known service on any machine. To avoid such bounce attacks, it is suggested that servers not open data connections to TCP ports less than 1024. If a server receives a PORT command containing a TCP port number less than 1024, the suggested response is 504 (defined as "Command not implemented for that parameter" by [PR85]). Note that this still leaves non-well known servers (those running on ports greater than 1023) vulnerable to bounce attacks. Several proposals (e.g., [AOM98] and [Pis94]) provide a mechanism that would allow data connections to be made using a transport protocol other than TCP. Similar precautions should be taken to protect well known services when using these protocols. Also note that the bounce attack generally requires that a perpetrator be able to upload a file to an FTP server and later download it to the service being attacked. Using proper file protections will prevent this behavior. However, attackers can also attack services by sending random data from a remote FTP server which may cause problems for some services. Disabling the PORT command is also an option for protecting against the bounce attack. Most file transfers can be made using only the PASV command [Bel94]. The disadvantage of disabling the PORT command is that one loses the ability to use proxy FTP, but proxy FTP may not be necessary in a particular environment. 4 Restricted Access For some FTP servers, it is desirable to restrict access based on network address. For example, a server might want to restrict access to certain files from certain places (e.g., a certain file should not be transferred out of an organization). In such a situation, the server should confirm that the network address of the remote hosts on both the control connection and the data connection are within the organization before sending a restricted file. By checking both connections, a server is protected against the case when the control connection is established with a trusted host and the data connection is not. Likewise, the client should verify the IP address of the remote host after accepting a connection on a port opened in listen mode to verify that the connection was made by the expected server. Expires: April, 1999 [Page 3]  draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt October 1998 Note that restricting access based on network address leaves the FTP server vulnerable to "spoof" attacks. In a spoof attack, for example, an attacking machine could assume the host address of another machine inside an organization and download files that are not accessible from outside the organization. Whenever possible, secure authentication mechanisms should be used, such as those outlined in [HL97]. 5 Protecting Passwords To minimize the risk of brute force password guessing through the FTP server, it is suggested that servers limit the number of attempts that can be made at sending a correct password. After a small number of attempts (3-5), the server should close the control connection with the client. Before closing the control connection the server must send a return code of 421 ("Service not available, closing control connection." [PR85]) to the client. In addition, it is suggested that the server impose a 5 second delay before replying to an invalid "PASS" command to diminish the efficiency of a brute force attack. If available, mechanisms already provided by the target operating system should be used to implement the above suggestions. An intruder can subvert the above mechanisms by establishing multiple, parallel control connections to a server. To combat the use of multiple concurrent connections, the server could either limit the total number of control connections possible or attempt to detect suspicious activity across sessions and refuse further connections from the site. However, both of these mechanisms open the door to "denial of service" attacks, in which an attacker purposely initiates the attack to disable access by a valid user. Standard FTP [PR85] sends passwords in clear text using the "PASS" command. It is suggested that FTP clients and servers use alternate authentication mechanisms that are not subject to eavesdropping (such as the mechanisms being developed by the IETF Common Authentication Technology Working Group [HL97]). 6 Privacy All data and control information (including passwords) is sent across the network in unencrypted form by standard FTP [PR85]. To guarantee the privacy of the information FTP transmits, a strong encryption scheme should be used whenever possible. One such mechanism is defined in [HL97]. 7 Protecting Usernames Standard FTP [PR85] specifies a 530 response to the USER command when the username is rejected. If the username is valid and a password is required FTP returns a 331 response instead. In order to prevent a malicious client from determining valid usernames on a server, it is suggested that a server always return 331 to the USER Expires: April, 1999 [Page 4]  draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt October 1998 command and then reject the combination of username and password for an invalid username. 8 Port Stealing Many operating systems assign dynamic port numbers in increasing order. By making a legitimate transfer, an attacker can observe the current port number allocated by the server and ``guess'' the next one that will be used. The attacker can make a connection to this port, thus denying another legimate client the ability to make a transfer. Alternativly, the attacker can steal a file meant for a legitimate user. In addition, an attacker can insert a forged file into a data stream thought to come from an authenticated client. This problem can be mitigated by making FTP clients and servers use random local port numbers for data connections, either by requesting random ports from the operating system or using system dependent mechanisms. 9 Software-Base Security Problems The emphasis in this document is on protocol-related security issues. There are a number of documented FTP security-related problems that are due to poor implementation as well. Although the details of these types of problems are beyond the scope of this document, it should be pointed out that the following FTP features has been abused in the past and should be treated with great care by future implementers: Anonymous FTP Anonymous FTP refers to the ability of a client to connect to an FTP server with minimal authentication and gain access to public files. Security problems arise when such a user can read all files on the system or can create files. [CERT92:09] [CERT93:06] Remote Command Execution An optional FTP extension, "SITE EXEC", allows clients to execute arbitrary commands on the server. This feature should obviously be implemented with great care. There are several documented cases of the FTP "SITE EXEC" command being used to subvert server security [CERT94:08] [CERT95:16] Debug Code Several previous security compromises related to FTP can be attributed to software that was installed with debugging features enabled [CERT88:01]. This document recommends that implementors of FTP servers with these capabilities review all of the CERT advisories for attacks on these or similar mechanisms before releasing their software. Expires: April, 1999 [Page 5]  draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt October 1998 10 Conclusion Using the above suggestions can decrease the security problems associated with FTP servers without eliminating functionality. Acknowledgments We would like to thank Alex Belits, Jim Bound, William Curtin, Robert Elz, Paul Hethmon, Alun Jones and Stephen Tihor for their helpful comments on this paper. Also, we thank the FTPEXT WG members who gave many useful suggestions at the Memphis IETF meeting. References [AOM98] Mark Allman, Shawn Ostermann, Craig Metz. FTP Extensions for IPv6 and NATs, September 1998. RFC 2428. [Bel94] Steve Bellovin. Firewall-Friendly FTP, February 1994. RFC 1579. [CERT88:01] CERT Advisory CA-88:01. ftpd Vulnerability. December, 1988 ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/ [CERT92:09] CERT Advisory CA-92:09. AIX Anonymous FTP Vulnerability. April 27, 1992. ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/ [CERT93:06] CERT Advisory CA-93:06. Wuarchive ftpd Vulnerability. September 19,1997 ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/ [CERT94:08] CERT Advisory CA-94:08. ftpd Vulnerabilities. September 23, 1997. ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/ [CERT95:16] CERT Advisory CA-95:16. wu-ftpd Misconfiguration Vulnerability. September 23, 1997 ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/ [CERT97:27] CERT Advisory CA-97.27. FTP Bounce. January 8, 1998. ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/ [HL97] M. Horowitz and S. J. Lunt. FTP Security Extensions, October 1997. RFC 2228. [Pis94] D. Piscitello. FTP Operation Over Big Address Records (FOOBAR), June 1994. RFC 1639. [Pos81] J. Postel. Transmission Control Protocol, September 1981. RFC 793. [PR85] J. Postel and J. Reynolds. File Transfer Protocol (FTP), October 1985. RFC 959. [RP94] J. Reynolds and J. Postel. Assigned Numbers, October 1994. RFC 1700. http://www.iana.org. Expires: April, 1999 [Page 6]  draft-ietf-ftpext-sec-consider-02.txt October 1998 Author's Addresses: Mark Allman NASA Lewis Research Center/Sterling Software 21000 Brookpark Rd. MS 54-2 Cleveland, OH 44135 mallman@lerc.nasa.gov Shawn Ostermann School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Ohio University 416 Morton Hall Athens, OH 45701 ostermann@cs.ohiou.edu Expires: April, 1999 [Page 7]